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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Roy Roland Araiza appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession
of methamphetamine.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The

state

charged

Araiza

with

one

count

of

possession

of

methamphetamine and another count for possession of oxycodone, with an
enhancement for being a persistent violator.

(R., pp. 49-50, 86-88.)

moved to suppress evidence found in a search of his car.

Araiza

(R., pp. 76-77.)

Following an evidentiary hearing, the court found the relevant facts as follows:
On the late evening of January 13, 2013, and into the early
morning hours of January 14, 2013, the defendant was stopped on
suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol. 1 Officer Kevin Loosli responded with his drug dog.
However, prior to running his dog around the car and while Araiza
was performing field sobriety tests with another officer, Officer
Loosli noticed a yellow pill imprinted with the number "230" on the
driver's seat.
Officer Loosli testified that, in his experience as a police
officer, the pill resembled a prescription pill and not an over-thecounter pill. Officer Loosli also testified that people who have
prescriptions generally keep their pills in the prescription bottle
while those individuals who possess prescription pills illegally
generally do not. Based on Officer Loosli's belief that the pill was in
Araiza's possession illegally, he retrieved the pill without asking
permission from Araiza. The pill was confirmed to be Oxycodone by
a drug identification search on the Internet. Araiza never produced
a prescription for the pill.
Law enforcement then searched the vehicle and found
methamphetamine. Araiza has been charged with possession of
both the pill and the methamphetamine.

1

During the hearing on the present motion, Araiza's parole
officer, Leslie Homer, testified that as of the time of this incident,
Araiza was on parole and had agreed to certain conditions,
including:
The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her
person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and
other real property or structures owned or leased by
the defendant or for which the defendant is the
controlling authority conducted by any agent of the
Idaho Dept of Correction or law enforcement officer.
The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment
Rights concerning searches.

The traffic stop was not challenged and therefore will not be
discussed here.
{R., pp. 140-41.) The district court upheld the search on two bases.

First, it

concluded that Araiza had consented to searches and waived his rights under
the Fourth Amendment as part of his parole.

(R., pp. 142-49.)

Second, it

concluded that seeing the loose pill in plain sight provided probable cause for a
search under the automobile exception. (R., pp. 150-55.)
Araiza conditionally pied guilty to possession of methamphetamine,
preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, and the state
dismissed the other count and the enhancement.

(R., pp. 232, 243-44, 246.)

Araiza timely appealed from entry of judgment. (R., pp. 262-70.)
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ISSUE
Araiza states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Araiza's motion
to suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Araiza failed to show that he, as a parolee, retained a privacy right
that was infringed by officers when they searched his car?

3

ARGUMENT
Araiza Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Concluded
Araiza Failed To Show Any Unconstitutional Intrusion Upon His Privacy

A.

Introduction
It is undisputed that Araiza was on parole at the time of the search, and

that as a condition of that parole he had agreed that he "shall consent to the
search" of his vehicle and "waive[d] [his] Fourth Amendment Rights concerning
searches." (R., p. 141.) The district court concluded the search was within the
scope of this waiver of privacy rights.

(R., pp. 142-49.) Moreover, the search

was supported by probable cause. (R., pp. 150-55.) Because Araiza has failed
to show error in the determination that the search did not intrude upon an
expectation that was reasonable for him to believe he retained on parole, he has
failed to show error by the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

Garcia Had No Expectation Of Privacy Relative To The Search Because
Of His Status As A Parolee
"A person challenging a search has the burden of showing he or she had

a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place to be searched." State v.
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Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008). To meet this burden
the moving party must demonstrate both "a subjective expectation of privacy in
the object of the challenged search" and that "society [is] willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable."

kl

Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against
governmental intrusion.

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United

States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).

"[P)ersons conditionally released to

societies have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by
government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise would be unreasonable or
invalid under traditional constitutional concepts."

State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho

841,843,736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987). Thus, "the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee."
Samson, 547 U.S. at 856. Because Araiza, as a parolee, had no expectation to
be free from suspicionless searches, he certainly had no expectation to be free
from the search in this case, which commenced after officers saw, in plain view,
a pill they suspected was a controlled substance.
Although parolees do not reasonably expect to be free of suspicionless
searches, Araiza contends his parole agreement conferred upon him an
expectation of privacy that was violated in this case. Specifically, on appeal as
he did below, Araiza contends that his parole agreement conferred upon him a
reasonable expectation of privacy because it gave him an expectation that
officers would request to search (a request he was powerless to deny) and

5

reinstated his right to privacy under the state constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp.
7-13.) Neither of these claims has merit.
The parole condition applicable to Araiza stated:
The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her person,
residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real property or
structures owned or leased by the defendant or for which the
defendant is the controlling authority conducted by any agent of the
Idaho Dept of Correction or law enforcement officer. The defendant
waives his/her Fourth Amendment Rights concerning searches.
(R., p. 141; see also Exhibit 2.) No construction of this language leads to the

conclusion that it bestowed upon Araiza a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his car at the time of the search.

Rather, it makes clear that Araiza had no

expectation that officers would not search his car, especially after seeing a loose
pill they suspected was a controlled substance.
Araiza contends that the language "shall consent" "requires Mr. Araiza to
consent in the future."

(Appellant's brief, p. 10.)

Because he signed the

agreement prior to the search this is exactly what happened.

Araiza had no

expectation that a condition that he "shall consent" to a search of his car granted
him privacy rights in the car. Araiza next argues that the requirement of future
consent implies a requirement of a future request. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.)
This argument is without merit because there is no requirement of a request,
implied or otherwise, in the language of the parole agreement. Even if Araiza
had an expectation of a request, he had no ability to decline it, and so still had no
reasonable expectation that officers would not search his car.
conferred no reasonable expectation of privacy in the car.
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This language

Next Araiza argues that because the search term of the parole agreement
references only the Fourth Amendment it restored his privacy expectations under
Article I, § 17, of the Idaho constitution.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) "The

guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under [Article I, § 17] is
substantially the same as the Fourth Amendment." State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81,
88, 90 P.3d 306, 313 (2004).

Waiver of the rights granted by the Fourth

Amendment is therefore necessarily a waiver of the same rights granted by
Article I,§ 17, with certain irrelevant exceptions.

JsL

at 88-89, 90 P.3d 313-314

(listing limited areas where Article I, § 17 has been interpreted more broadly than
the Fourth Amendment). Garcia's argument that failure to mention Article I, § 17
completely nullified the search term of his probation agreement, such that he
enjoyed the same expectation of privacy as any other resident of Idaho, is
meritless. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy created by the terms of
the parole agreement. Therefore, the search was constitutionally reasonable.

D.

The Search Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion
A search of premises controlled by a probationer is reasonable if there is

reasonable suspicion of a violation of the terms of probation, regardless of the
scope of any waiver of search rights as a condition of probation. United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001 ); State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496-98, 148
P.3d 1240, 1242-44 (2006). As a parolee, Araiza did not enjoy greater rights.
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). In this case officers saw a pill they
suspected was a controlled substance in Araiza's car.

Because this provided

reasonable suspicion of a parole violation, the search was constitutionally valid.
7

Araiza argues that the officers lacked probable cause to search the car
"because the pill's connection to illegal activity was not immediately apparent."
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) As set forth above, because of Araiza's status as a
parolee the search was justified by reasonable suspicion, a standard less than
probable cause. To the extent probable cause might be required to justify the
search, the district court correctly stated the law and analysis for searching a car
under the automobile exception, applicable regardless of the suspect's parole
status. The state hereby adopts the district court's legal analysis. (R., pp. 13957 (attached as an appendix).) Araiza has failed to show error.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction.

DATED this 16th day of Decemb

KENNETH K. JORGENSfN
Deputy Attorney General '
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of December, 2014, served
a true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a
copy addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

tl..------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIB FIFTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TIIB STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

)
vs.
ROY ROLAND ARAIZA, SR.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 2013-374
FINDINGS OF FACT,
MEMORANDUM DECISION,
AND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

TI-IIS MATIER is before the court on the motion of defendant, Roy Roland

Araiza, Sr., to suppress evidence obtained in this matter. The motion was heard on May
14, 2013. The state of Idaho was represented at the hearing by Peter Hatch, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Twin Falls County. Roy Roland Araiza, Sr. was present and
represented by Keith Roark. The court heard testimony and arguments, and has
reviewed the motion and applicable law. Based thereon, the court hereby DENIES
Araiza' s Motion to Suppress.

MEMORANDUM DECTSION AND ORDER

1
139

FINDINGS OF FACT

On the late evening of January 13, 2013, and into the early morning hours of
January 14, 2013, the defendant was stopped on suspicion of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol. 1 Officer Kevin Loosli responded with his drug
dog. However, prior to running his dog around the car and while Araiza was
performing field sobriety tests with another officer, Officer Loosli noticed a yellow pill
imprinted with the number "230" on the driver's seat.
Officer Loosli testified that, in his experience as a police officer, the pill
resembled a prescription pill and not an over-the-counter pill. Officer Loosli also
testified that people who have prescriptions generally keep their pills in the
prescription bottle while those individuals who possess prescription pills illegally
generally do not. Based on Officer Loosli's belief that the pill was in Araiza's possession
illegally, he retrieved the pill without asking permission from Araiza. The pill was
confirmed to be Oxycodone by a drug identification search on the Internet. Araiza
never produced a prescription for the pill.
Law enforcement then searched the vehicle and found methamphetamine.
Araiza has been charged with possession of both the pill and the methamphetamine.

1

The traffic stop was not challenged and therefore will not be discussed here.

MEMORANDUM DEOSI0N AND ORDER

2
140

During the hearing on the present motion, Araiza' s parole officer, Leslie Homer,
testified that as of the time of this incident, Araiza was on parole and had agreed to
certain conditions, including:
The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her person,
residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real
property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or
for which the defendant is the controlling authority
conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction or
law enforcement officer. The defendant waives his/her
Fourth Amendment Rights concerning searches.
Araiza filed a Motion to Suppress claiming that the search was done without
probable cause or a valid consent/waiver.
APPLICABLE LAW

Both Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution require that all searches and seizures be reasonable. A
warrantless search is unreasonable unless it falls into an exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 908, 174 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2007).
"Under the automobile exception, police may search an automobile and the containers
within it when they have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains
contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,281, 108 P.3d 424,429
(Ct. App. 2005). Additionally, an officer may retrieve items that are in plain view in an
automobile if he has probable cause to believe the items are contraband or evidence of a
crime. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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These rights are diminished for persons on probation or parole. "[P]ersons
conditionally released to societies have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby
rendering intrusions by government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise would be
unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional concepts." State v. Purdum, 147
Idaho 206,209,207 P.3d 182, 185 (2009). However, "[c]onditions of probation, especially
a waiver of a Fourth Amendment right, cannot be implied." State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho
494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).
ANALYSIS

The state provides two reasons to justify the warrantless search of the vehicle in
this case. First, the state argues that Araiza had consented to and/or waived his rights
concerning searches as part of his conditions of parole. Second, the state argues that the
search was justified by probable cause.
A. Consent/Waiver.
1. The defendant has consented to all searches.

The state argues that Araiza waived his right to challenge the search as part of
his conditions of parole. The specific condition stated:
The defendant shall consent to the search of his/her person,
residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real
property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or
for which the defendant is the controlling authority
conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction or
law enforcement officer. The defendant waives his/her
Fourth Amendment Rights concerning searches.
MEMORANDUM DEOSI0N AND ORDER
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The state argues that even if the beginning of the condition implies Araiza would
consent only if asked by an officer, the second sentence indicates that an officer need
not ask permission since Araiza waived his rights to government searches generally.
Araiza counters, arguing that while a defendant may generally waive his or her
right to be free from searches, his special condition of probation did not do so and that
the second sentence is ambiguous and does not waive his right to be free from searches
under the Idaho Constitution.
Araiza cites to two cases in his argument. In State v. Gawron, the Idaho Supreme
Court held that an advanced waiver on searches was valid.112 Idaho 841,843,736 P.2d
1295, 1297 (1987). In that case, the specific waiver stated:
That probationer does hereby agree and consent to the
search of his person, automobile, real property, and any
other property at any time and at any place by any law
enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation officer, and
does waive his constitutional right to be free from such
searches.
Araiza contrasts that decision and condition with another case, State v. Turek, 150
Idaho 745, 749, 250 P.3d 796, 800, (Ct. App. 2011). In Turek, the Idaho Court of Appeals
examined a similar condition, but ruled that it was not a complete waiver of all Fourth
Amendment rights. In that case, the specific waiver stated that the defendant was
required to:
[s]ubmit to searches of his/her person, residence, and any
property under his/her control, without a warrant pursuant
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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to probation supervision, at the request of the Probation
Officer or Law Enforcement.

Id. at 746,250 P.3d at 797. The Court ruled that, although the defendant agreed to
submit to searches as part of his probation, the searches still had to be preceded by a
request from law enforcement.

Araiza claims the special condition in his case is more akin to the special
condition in Turek. He argues that the waiver in Gawron was automatic because the
phrase, "does hereby agree and consent" was a waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights
at the time of signing, whereas the agreement to submit to searches" in Turek means
II

that the probationer must submit, but only after being requested to do so. As the special
condition in this case contains the phrase "shall consent to," Araiza claims that a law
enforcement officer must make a request prior to the search in order to trigger the
special condition. This court disagrees with Araiza.
While "submit to searches" and "shall consent to" appear to be similar, the Court
of Appeals did not hinge its decision on that phrase in Turek. Instead, the Court of
Appeals focused on the prerequisite "at the request of" in making the distinction
between Turek and Gawron. Id. at 749,250 P.3d at 800. The Court of Appeals concluded
that a probation condition that requires a probationer to submit to a search 'at the
II

request of' an officer requires that the probationer be informed of an officer's intent to
conduct an impending search." Id. at 752,250 P.3d at 803.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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-------------------·

-

The phrase at issue in this case is very similar to the phrase at issue in State v.
Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,207 P.3d 182 (2009). In that case, an officer who knew the

defendant was on probation saw Purdum driving and decided to stop him for no other
reason other than to have him submit to a drug test. Id. at 207,207 P.3d at 183. Purdum
arrived at a residence and, noticing the officer's presence, took off running. Id.
Eventually, the officer was able to catch and detain Purdum. Id. A search of Purdum's
car incident to arrest revealed drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. Purdum moved to
suppress that evidence claiming he had been improperly seized and therefore the
subsequent search was invalid. Id. The state countered, claiming he had waived his
constitutional right to be free from seizures through a special term of probation. The
special term of probation stated:
The Defendant shall submit to random blood, breath and/or
urine analysis upon the request of the Court, his probation
officer or any law enforcement official.

Id. at 210, 207 P.3d at 186.
The Court reviewed its analysis in Gawron, including the observation that
"persons conditionally released to societies have a reduced expectation of privacy,
thereby rendering intrusions by government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise
would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional concepts." Id. at 209,
207 P.3d at 185. In upholding the officer's actions in relation to the waiver in Purdum,
the court stated:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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Thus, the language of Purdum' s condition of probation is
very similar to the language of the condition at issue in
Gawron. That condition used the phrase 'at any time and at
any place by any law enforcement officer.' Purdum's
condition of probation constituted a similar express waiver
of his constitutional right to be free from warrantless
searches.
Id. at 210, 207 P.3d at 186. The Court further stated that "Purdum consented to submit
to random evidentiary testing and, therefore, he impliedly consented to a limited
seizure of his person necessary to effectuate such searches." Id.
The Court of Appeals restated the Purdum holding in a subsequent case, stating:
"that a probationer's waiver requiring him to submit to 'random' [drug testing] upon
the request of law enforcement personnel, encompassed a waiver of his right to be free
of suspicionless seizures." State v. Hedgecock, 147 Idaho 580, 584, 212 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Ct.
App. 2009).
In this court's view, Araiza' s special condition is most similar to the special
conditions in Purdum and Gawron. Araiza's condition states that he "shall consent to
the search," with no mention of an officer's request. Purdum's condition stated that he
"shall submit to random blood, breath and/or urine analysis upon the request of the
Court, his probation officer or any law enforcement official." 147 Idaho at 210, 207 P.3d at
186 (emphasis in original). The Idaho Supreme Court treated that phrase in Purdum as
an express waiver and consent to a seizure for evidentiary testing even when the officer
does not actually ask first. Thus, if the phrase "shall submit to ... upon the request"
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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constitutes an express waiver even when no request is made, then Araiza' s condition
"shall consent to" is correspondingly an express waiver as to searches.
In Gawron, the language at issue was that the probationer "does hereby agree and
consent." While Araiza' s condition does not contain language of an express, immediate
waiver, the "shall consent to" language, without any condition as to timing, implies that
Araiza would consent before, during, and even after any searches under that condition.
There is no prerequisite that an officer actually ask first. 2
Araiza' s special condition does not fall under Turek. This court notes that the
language in Purdum (a 2009 Idaho Supreme Court case) contains the phrase, "upon the
request" that is nearly identical to Turek's (a 2011 Idaho Court of Appeals case) "at the
request of," which is the phrase the Court of Appeals used to distinguish Turek from

Gawron (a 1987 Idaho Supreme Court case). Considering that the Court of Appeals'
distinction between Turek and Gawron could not be drawn between Turek and Purdum,
the Courts of Appeals' stated distinction between those two cases was that "in Purdum
the probationer was present at the time of the search." Turek, 150 Idaho at 749,250 P.3d
at 749.

This concept is supported by Purdum and Hedgecock, above. As the condition in Purdum stated that the defendant
"shall submit to," there could be an argument that the defendant was required to submit, but did not have to and
would only be subject to a probation violation ifhe withheld consent. However, the Court held that the "shall submit
to" language permitted a suspicionless seizure. A suspicionless seizure contemplates a defendant that has not freely
submitted to the testing as, had he submitted as required by the special condition, there would be no need to "seize"
him. Therefore, the language and holding in Purdum allowed for a seizure of the defendant, whether or not he is
asked to submit. In the present case, the phrase "shall consent to" is not even accompanied by "at the request'' or
''upon the request" as seen in Purdum and ultimately dispositive in Turek.
2

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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To be clear, the Court of Appeals limited its analysis in Turek to "[wJhether a
probation condition which requires that a probationer submit to warrantless searches
'at the request of' [law enforcement] requires that the probationer be notified of the
search and/or consent at the time of the search ... " Id. The phrase "at the request of" is
not present in Araiza' s special condition. This court also notes that at no time in the

Purdum case did the officer request a search or seizure of the probationer.
Like Purdum, in the present case a request to search Araiza' s car was never made.
Also like Purdum, Araiza was present when his car was searched-except that he was
performing field sobriety tests nearby instead of sitting in the back of a patrol vehicle
like the probationer in Purdum. Therefore, the distinctions that the Court of Appeals
found in Turek with regard to Gawron and Purdum -pertaining to "upon request" and
presence and/or notification of a search-do not apply to the present case.
2. The defendant has waived any right to be free from searches.
Even if some distinction could be made between the two Idaho Supreme Court
cases and the case at bar, the second sentence of Araiza' s special condition regarding
searches permits the search in this case. That sentence states, "[t]he defendant waives
his/her Fourth Amendment Rights concerning searches." Araiza argues that this phrase
is ambiguous in that it does not waive the rights to be free from searches provided in
Article 1 Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

10
148

First, the court notes that the wording of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution are nearly identical-with the only differences
relating to warrants which are not at issue here. The argument that somehow Araiza
could waive his Fourth Amendment rights and not the identical rights under the Idaho
Constitution is unavailing and-as both cover the same areas-would mean that the
Fourth Amendment waiver statement is meaningless if the Idaho rights remain.
Second, the reference to the "Fourth Amendment," is not ambiguous. In fact, it is
often used by the Idaho appellate courts to refer generally to the rights contained in that
Amendment. See generally, Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 182; and Turek, 150 Idaho
745,250 P.3d 745. It is commonly accepted that searches under the "Fourth
Amendment" includes all searches, including those that would otherwise come within
the purview of the Idaho Constitution.
Therefore, even if the first sentence of Araiza' s condition does not allow the
search undertaken in this case, the second sentence would, as Araiza would have
understood what "Fourth Amendment" rights he would have been giving up as part of
being paroled when he signed the agreement.
Araiza' s signed consent to searches acts as a waiver of hls rights to be free from
searches. Therefore, Araiza cannot challenge the search in this case.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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B.

Probable Cause.
Although Araiza waived his right to challenge the search in this case, this court

holds that the search was supported by probable cause in any event.
"Under the automobile exception [to the Fourth Amendment], police may search
an automobile and the containers within it when they have probable cause to believe
that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Gibson, 141
Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 2005).
The "plain view'' exception to the warrant requirement has also been applied to
automobiles. In Texas v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that when an officer views
items in an automobile that he has probable cause to believe are incriminating, he may
retrieve those items. 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983). "The seizure of property in plain view
involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is
probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity." Id. (quoting Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)). The Court noted that the "immediately apparent"

criminal nature of the items viewed did not require that the officer "know" that the
items were contraband or evidence of a crime. Id. at 741.
Put simply, an officer can retrieve items in plain view in an automobile when he
has probable cause to believe those items are contraband or evidence of a crime. The
officer may also search a vehicle under the automobile exception if he has probable
cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime.
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"Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard." Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281,
108 P .3d at 429. "A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is
present is all that is required." Id. Probable cause "merely requires that the facts
available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
certain items may be contraband ... it does not demand any showing that such a belief
be correct or more likely true than false." Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.
In the present case, Officer Loosli looked through the window of the car and

noticed a yellow pill on the driver's seat. Officer Loosli, through his experience, had
developed an understanding about how over-the-counter pills appear generally, and
this yellow pill did not have that appearance. The yellow pill had numbering that,
according to Officer Loosli, was indicative of a prescription pill. Officer Loosli believed
that the pill was possessed without a valid prescription because it was not in a
prescription pill bottle and no prescription bottle was in sight. Officer Loosli testified
that, based on his experience, when individuals illegally possess prescription pills, the
pills are loose or in containers that do not have a prescription on them. In contrast,
when pills are possessed under a prescription, those pills are usually in a prescription
bottle, or near a prescription bottle.
This court holds that such observations, coupled with on-the-job experience
would give a person of reasonable caution a strong assumption that the pill was
contraband. In so holding, the court likens the situation to that of a drug dog sniff
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giving rise to probable cause. "When a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a
lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has
probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search it
without a warrant." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,281, 108 P.3d 424,429 (Ct. App. 2005).
A drug dog, however, cannot give a positive guarantee that drugs are present as the
dog is sensing the presence of the odor of drugs and the odor may be remaining from
drugs having been in the car or the odor of the drugs on some fabric in the car or on the
occupants of the car. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1056-57 (2013) (explaining why
a drug dog's indication on a car where drugs are not ultimately found may not be an
error).
Considering that a drug dog's alert of the presence of the odor of drugswhether or not drugs are actually present-in a vehicle is sufficient for probable cause
to search the vehicle, this court believes that an officer's perception of a loose pill
appearing to be a prescription pill on the driver's seat provides probable cause that the
pill is contraband. The officer may be mistaken, but the indicators observed by the
officer-just like odors of drugs to drug dogs-pomt to the pill being contraband.
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The pill was in plain view. Officer Loosli had probable cause to believe that it
was contraband. Under the plain view doctrine, Officer Loosli could legally retrieve the

pill.3
After confirming that the pill was a controlled substance, the officers then had
probable cause to believe that the car contained more contraband and could lawfully
search the car under the automobile exception. A subsequent search revealed
methamphetamine.
Araiza argues that probable cause did not exist because 1) the officer did not
know for a fact that the pill was a prescription pill when he went to retrieve it and 2) the
officer did not ask Araiza whether he had a valid prescription before retrieving the pill.
Both arguments fail.
As noted above, an officer does not need to "know'' the item is contraband.
Brown, 460 U.S. at 741. He is only required to have "probable cause to associate the

property with criminal activity." Id. at 741-42. Such a standard is reflected in drug dog
sniff cases. As noted above, a drug dog may indicate on an automobile solely because
drugs were recently, but no longer, present in the automobile. The officer cannot

3 Whether or not seeing the pill would give probable cause to search the entire vehicle is not an issue here. Generally
it would be more prudent to retrieve the pill under the plain view doctrine, and examine its nature further. If the pill
turns out to be a controlled substance, the officer would clearly have probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle
for more contraband under the automobile exception because the officer could reasonably believe that the
automobile contained more contraband or evidence of a crime (possession). That is exactly what was done by the
officers in this case.
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"know" that there are drugs in the car just because a drug dog indicates and the officer
is not required to "know" to support probable cause.
While Officer Loosli could have asked Araiza whether he had a prescription for
the pill, any answer Araiza would have given would not alter the probable cause
Officer Loosli already had to retrieve the pill. In essence, there are four answers to such
a question: 1) Araiza did not have a prescription because the pill was an over-thecounter pill; 2) he did not know about any pill; 3) he did not have a prescription; or 4)
he did have a prescription.
Once probable cause is reached, it is not necessarily undone solely because other
information is obtained that seems to contradict it. In State v. Anderson, 2012 WL
4055342, 1 (Idaho Supreme Court), a drug dog indicated on an automobile. The drug
dog was put inside the automobile and failed to indicate once inside. Id. The Idaho
Supreme Court ruled that, while the failure to indicate inside the automobile somewhat
undercut the initial drug dog detection, such a failure did not unravel probable cause
because other factors supporting probable cause were present. Id. at 5.
Araiza provided no legal support for the concept that an officer, even when he
has probable cause, must exhaust all other investigative avenues-such as asking about
an apparently illegally-possessed controlled substance- before performing a
warrantless search. This court is unaware of any such legal authority.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

16
154

Here, Officer Loosli observed a loose-apparent prescription pill with no
indication of a prescription. He then had probable cause to retrieve the pill under the
plain view doctrine. Officer Loosli could have asked Araiza about the pill, but none of
the four possible answers would have undone the probable cause. Had Araiza claimed
it was an over-the-counter pill, probable cause would still be present due to the
suspicious circumstances and only retrieving the pill would confirm or contradict
Araiza' s claim. Had Araiza claimed he had a prescription and even produced the
prescription, the only way to verify the suspicious pill was the drug under that
prescription would be to retrieve the pill and check it. Had Araiza claimed he did not
know what the pill was, the officer would still be permitted to retrieve the pill to find
out if it was, in fact, a controlled substance. Therefore, asking about the pill would
provide the officer with no real information and have no effect on the probable cause
that Officer Loosli had already developed based on his observations and experience.
Officer Loosli had probable cause under the plain view doctrine based on his
observations and experience to retrieve the loose pill. Once the pill was verified to be a
controlled substance, the officers had probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle for
more contraband and/or evidence of a crime.
CONCLUSION

Araiza waived his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable
searches when he was released on parole. Even had he not, the officers had probable
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cause to retrieve the pill in question and then conduct the subsequent search. Therefore,
Araiza's Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated This

2 'f-day of May, 2013.
District Judge
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l.C.R. 49 (b)

NOTICE OF ORDER
I, Shelley Bartlett, Deputy Clerk for the County Twin Falls, do hereby certify that
on the 21: day of May, 2013, I have caused to be served a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing document: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, to each of the persons as listed below:
Peter Hatch
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 126
Twin Falls, ID 83303
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Keith Roark
409 North Main Street

Hailey, ID 83333
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